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ROBINSON-PATIAN ACT - ANTI-TRUST OR
ANTI-CONSUMER?
DAVIS W.

MORTON, JR.* AND ALBERT

H. CoTToN**

"By practices which are unethical when viewed from the
angle of his competitors, a businessman is frequently able to
undersell them; the resultant lowered prices ease the strain on
his customers' pocketbooks fully as much if he had acted 'fairly.'"
Frank, J., in StandardBrands,Inc. v. Smidler.1
JUDGE FRANK was writing in a trade-mark case. The truth which

he pointed out, however, applies equally to price discrimination laws
such as Robinson-Patman,a retail price maintenance laws such as
Miller-Tydings,2 and state "fair trade" and sale-below cost laws.$
TiEE LEGISLATION
Anti-trust legislation was originally based on the theory that

the public has an interest in preserving competition because hard
competition will automatically lower prices. Competition would
make direct price fixing by Government unnecessary except in the
public utility field, the habitat of natural monopoly. Both the Sherman Act 4 and the Clayton Act carry out this philosophy. Only
where prices were driven down temporarily to close out a competitor was there any ban on price cutting in the original legislation.
With the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 a new
notion entered anti-trust law-protection of the competing businessman." Hard competition gives way to soft. Seventeen years of ex*A.B., LL.B., M.S., Syracuse University; LL.M., Yale Law School;
Member of the New York Bar.
**A.B., LL.B., Duke University; Member of the North Carolina Bar.
1. 151 F. 2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1945) (concurring opinion).
Ia. 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946) as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
2. 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946) as amended, 50 Stat. 693 (1937).
3. Collected in CCH Trade Reg. Rep., iii
8000 to 8960.
4. 15 U. S. C. §1et seq.
5. 15 U. S. C.§ 12 et seq.
6. Early criticisms appeared in Symposium, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob.
271-422 (1937).
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perience, however, has not led to the complete acceptance of the
view that the rival competitor, rather than the consumer, should be
protected.'.
The Act, a product of the depression, was a move in the wholesale grocers' battle against chain stores which has already produced
anti-chain store taxes." The wholesalers were in a bad way. Distribution costs under the old methods were about 50 per cent of the
retail price The chains were eliminating wholesalers, and passing
some of their savings on to customers. Since depression buyers were
price conscious, the corner grocer was going down with his wholesaler. Articulate merchants, through lobbies, successfully petitioned
Congress for relief. Consumer concern for price was forgotten.
Our primary concern here is with how Robinson-Patman hits
the consumer's pocketbook.' 0 Interests other than consumers also
7. Recent discussions include: Adelman, Effective Competition and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1948) ; Adelman, Integration and

Anti-Trust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27 (1949) (highly critical of the Act);

Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at

Robinson-Patinan,60 Yale L. J. 929 (1951) (advocating repeal) ; Rose, The

Right of a Businessman to Lower the Price of His Goods, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 221
(1951) ; Rose, Your Right to Lower Your Prices, 29 Harv. Bus. Rev. 90
(Sep., 1951) (suggesting that the present majority of the Supreme Court
follows the Sherman Act philosophy of hard competition); Simon, The
Case Against the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 297
(1952) ; Simon, Price Discriminationto Meet Competition, 1950 U. of Ill. L.
Forum 576 (advocating abolition of the Commission) ; Smith, Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rev. 405 (1951) ("Freedom of competition in the public interest would be
enhanced by use of the public interest test, as per the Sherman Act, in all
decisions, as opposed to the individual interest of competitors as under the
Patman Act.)"; Zlinkoff and Barnard, Basing Points and Quantity Discounts: The Supreme Court and a Competitive Economy, 1947 Term, 48 Col.
L. Rev. 985 (1948); Haslett, Price Discriminationsand Their Justification
under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 450 (1950);
Wright, Some Pitfalls of Economic Theory as a Guide to the Law of Competition, 37 Va. L. Rev. 1083 (1951) (Supporters of Robinson-Patman "are
not so much in favor of competition as of little business and the two are
not the same thing.") ; Handler, Anti-Trust-New Frontiersand Nez Perplexities, 6 Record of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York 59 (1951)
(denying fundamental conflict in philosophy between Robinson-Patman and
Sherman Act).
8. For accounts of the passage of the act see Fulda, Food Distribution
in the United States: The Struggle Between Independents and Chains, 99
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1951) ; Rowe, Price Discrimination,Competition, and
Confusion: Another Look at Rob-inson-Patman, 60 Yale L. J. 929, 931 (1951)
(quoting Rep. Patman: "Chain stores are out. There is no place for chain
stores in the American economic picture.").
9. McNair, Marketing Functions and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4
Law & Contemp. Probs. 334 (1937).
10. Comprehensive discussions of the act include: Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems under the Robinson-PatmanAct, American
Law Institute (1950) ; Oppenheim, Price and Service Discriminationsunder
the Robinson-Patman Act, American Law Institute (1949), and CCH Symposia on Robinson-Patman Act for 1946. 1947 and 1948.
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have reason to complain of it. Business is on notice that RobinsonPatman compliance may mean Sherman Act violation." The
Supreme Court has had difficulty with this conflict. 12 The Office of
Price Stabilization unhappily found that ceilings were sometimes
lower than the prices Robinson-Patman required. 3 Even if justified
in the depression, Robinson-Patman does not appear to fit either
normal or inflationary times.
The Act has been criticized as poorly drafted. 14 However technically true, this is probably the only criticism which is unfair. Since
its, sponsors were faced with the practical problem of getting it
through Congress without arousing the public, it should be praised
as one of the most skillful examples of double talk on the statute
books.
11 See the following, all in CCH Business Practices, 1951 Symposium:

Simon, Legal Price Fixing, p. 83; Van Cise, Practical Planning, p. 103;
Adelman, Integration and the Outlook for the Future, p. 135; Austern, Inconsistencies in the Law, p. 158. Madison, Proposed Amndments of the Federal
Anti-Trust Law and Its Relations to "Big Bushiess," CCH Antitrust Law

Symposium 1952, p. 106 ("Paragraph 6 of the Commission's order in Standard Oil Co. v. Trade Comm'n, 340 U. S. 231 (1951), in effect required the
oil company to maintain the resale prices of its wholesalers, a practice which,
if it had been upheld on appeal, would clearly have violated the Sherman Act.

In AutoKiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951) ....
matic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 194 F. 2d 433 (9th Cir.

1952) the Commission took the position that a buyer violates the Robinson-

Patman Act if the seller is unable to satisfy the Commission that its price is
legal under the Act. Such an interpretation, if followed, would tend to create
price uniformity, since a buyer could deal only with sellers who have a single
price or buy at his peril. The resulting price uniformity, however, would
subject the seller to the danger of being charged with conspiracy under the
doctrine of conscious parallel action.") Note, The Swinging Door-Or How
to Obey One Antitrust Law by Violating Another, 59 Yale L. J. 158 (1949).
12. Justice Jackson said, during the oral argument in the Standard Oil
case, supra note 11: "The whole philosophy-what troubles me-the whole
philosophy of the Sherman Antitrust Act is go out and compete, get business, fight for it. Now, the whole philosophy we are asked to enforce here
(under the Robinson-Patman Act) is that you really must not, you should let
this business go and not meet the competition. I have difficulty in knowing
where we are with this, and I should think the people who are trying to do
business would find it much more troublesome than we do, for it does not
trouble me but once a term, and it must trouble them every day." Madison,
supra note 11, at 110-111.
13. "Price Control v. Price Discrimination: What happens if a seller
finds that his prices to certain favored buyers tend substantially to lessen
competition, in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act? If he increases those
prices he violates a ceiling price regulation. If he decreases his prices to all
other customers enough to remove the unlawful discrimination, he puts
himself out of business. A seller in this predicament can apply to OPS for
permission to increase prices so as to cure his Robinson-Patman violation .
((OPS, GOR 18, 8/30/51)." P H Lawyer's Weekly Report, Sept. 10, 1951.
14. ". . . the cause of the trouble is the Act itself, which is vague and
general in its wording and which cannot be translated with assurance into
any detailed set of guiding yardsticks.' Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 189 F. 2d 893,
894 (2d Cir. 1951).
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The technique adopted was to follow each section with a proviso
which did lip service to traditional anti-trust ideas. For example,
Section 2(a) prohibits price discrimination, but adds "where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." So much for the "rule of
reason" of the anti-trust cases. The statute proceeds to muddle the
notion of what is competition by referring to "competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with the customers of either of them." In other
words, we will keep all the competitors in business, but we won't
let them compete with each other by cutting prices. What good to
the consumer is a competitor who doesn't cut prices?
Section 2(a) also contains a proviso exempting price discriminations based on cost, and mumbles about the right of customer
selection "in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade."
Section 2 (b), after providing that the showing of discrimination
shall establish a prima facie case, contains this gem: "Provided,
however, that nothing [herein contained] shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower
price . . . was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of
a competitor . . ." The net effect on the consumer here is that his

vendor is permitted to meet competition in a stratified price structure but prohibited from bettering it.
Section 2(c) is just as bad. It prohibits the payment of brokerage "except for services rendered." But may a buyer's agent receive
brokerage where he is the one who actually renders the services ?1
Since no cost defense is permitted under this section, and the integrated mass distributor must perform the broker's functions without
receiving from its suppliers the traditional reduction in price by
way of brokerage fee, the complying distributor has nothing but an
increased cost to pass along to the consumer.
Sections 2(d) and (e) are aimed at such practices as furnishing
demonstrators and making advertising allowances to dealers, with
the proviso that this can be done if "on proportionally equal terms
to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities." These sections do not appear to directly
affect consumers.16
15. Austin, Price Discrimination, American Law Institute, (1950) at
102: "Section 2(c) is undoubtedly the most ambiguous and faultily drafted
section of the act. Yet, surprisingly enough, it is the only section as to which
The 'except
no important questions of interpretation remain unsettled ....
for services rendered' clause ... has a very limited application. For all practical purposes it may be treated as having been read out of the statute."
16. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F. 2d 988 (Sth

ROBINSOXV-PATMAN ACT

Section 2(f) prohibits a buyer from knowingly inducing or receiving any price discrimination. It has been construed as placing
on the buyer the burden of proving the seller's costs, if such defense
is to be used.17 The section's undertones respecting pressures from
the buying side of the market to obtain lower prices are made ineffective by the cold fact that there is no accompanying guarantee
that a buyer will have available the necessary cost data to prepare
a defense.'5
Obviously the sponsors were trusting to the courts to give the
Act its intended effect. General terms were used deliberately to
avoid any danger that the act would be declared unconstitutional.'
An attempt was made to build a legislative history that would indi20
cate the real intent of Congress.
The fact that it was in form an amendment to the Clayton Act
might lead some courts to try to harmonize the two acts, rather than
to realize that Robinson-Patman was designed to shift the focus
from the anti-trust concept of price discrimination initiated by sellers
to price discrimination produced by pressure from the buying side
of the market. Nevertheless it was necessary to take the risk. Congress was not willing to openly abandon the country's traditional
anti-trust policy. The debates teem with claims that the legislation
was designed to strengthen the anti-trust laws.21
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773 (1945) ; Elizabeth Arden Inc. v. FTC,
156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), ccrt. denied, 331 U. S. 860 (1947); Sun Cosmetics Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F. 2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949) ;
United Cigar-Whelan Stores v. H. Weinrich Co., 107 F. Supp. 89 (S.D. N.Y.
1952).
17. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 194 F. 2d 433 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 344 U. S. 809 (1952).
18. See the complaint in Matter of Crown Zellerbach Co., FTC Docket
5421 (pending), where it is alleged respondents induced and received discrimi-

nations and refused to purchase unless granted lower prices than competitors.

Review refused because Commission order not yet issued, Crown Zellerbach v. FTC, 156 F. 2d 927 (9th Cir. 1946).
19. 80 Cong. Record 6429 (1936) : "Mr. Logan . . . if we attempt to
make exceptions of particular classes of business we may run into difficulties
with the Supreme Court... Y
20. H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; H. R. Rep. No.
2951, 74th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1936) ; Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) ; CCH Trade Reg. Rep., vol. 3. Austin, supra note 10, at 5: "The act is
ineptly drafted and contains many ambiguities and vague provisions, so that recourse to its legislative history is constatntly important in construing it. In the
thirteen years since this law has been on the books some of the uncertainties have been resolved by administrative interpretations and court decision;
but many important questions of construction remain for which an authoritative answer is still lacking."
21. Section 2 of the Clayton Act already prohibited price discrimination. A price difference was justified if made on any of these grounds:
differences in grade, quantity, quality or cost; to meet competition, or if it did
not in fact lessen competition. The Commission lost important cases under this
law, most notably Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F. 2d 620 (6th
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Faced with an act of this type there were several things the
Supreme Court could do:
1. Throw the entire act out as unconstitutional. By the time
that litigation under the act reached the courts, however, the era of
unconstitutionality was over. After all, the Constitution does say
that Congress has the power to "regulate commerce." This is what
the Act attempts to do. Actually, constitutional issues raised under
the act have been trivial.2 2 The Florida and Michigan highest courts,

in decisions showing an awareness of consumer interests, recently
have held state resale price maintenance laws unconstitutional, 2 but
there is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court will go this
far in the forseeable future.
2. Limit the application of the act by a restricted definition of
2
interstate commerce. This the Court has refused to do. 4
3. Go all the way with what the proponents of the act really had
2
in mind, and read the qualifying provisos out of the act. 5
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 557 (1939), involving the sale by Goodyear of tires to Sears Roebuck at a quantity discount not related to cost,
which were re-sold by Sears at prices below those charged by Goodyear's
dealers. The section was not totally ineffective. See Van Camp & Sons v.
American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1929). Perhaps the original Clayton Act
provision went as far as it is desirable to go if consumer interests are to
be considered.
22. Section (2a) was unsuccessfully attacked as an improper delegation of legislative power in the Elizabeth Arden cases, supra note 16; section
2(c) was attacked, also unsuccessfully, as a violation of due process in the
brokerage cases, infra notes 83 to 88; section 3, the criminal section, was held
to be sufficiently definite to support a civil action for triple damages in F & A
Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms, 98 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Balian
Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms, 99 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1951); and
Hipps v. Bowman Dairy. 1950-51 Trade Cases 1 62,859 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
Section 3 may not be sufficiently definite to be enforced as a criminal statute.
In United States v. Bowman Dairy, 89 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Il. 1949) the
court declines to pass on the question on motion, and the government later
dismissed a companion case, United States v. Borden Co., CCH Trade Reg.
Rep., 1948-51 Dec. ff 61,351.
23. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371
(Fla. 1949) ; Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Co., 334 Mich. 109,
54 N. W. 2d 268 (1952) ; Comment, 28 N.C. L. Rev. 336 (1950). The prevailing view is to the contrary, and at least two states have recently refused
to follow the Florida case: W. A. Schaeffer Pen Co. v. Barrett, 209 Miss. 1,
45 So. 2d 838 (1951) and Frankfort Distillers v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 477, 230
S.W. 2d 971 (1951).
24. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231 (1951). Lower courts, however, are reluctant to apply the act in situations they regard as local price
wars. Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co., 178 F. 2d 453 (5th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 953 (1950) ; Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F.
Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1951); Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 1950-51 Trade Cases
ff 62,816 (D.C. Cal. 1951).
25. This appears to be the approach of the dissenters in the Standard
Oil case, mtpra note 24, and was the fate of the proviso in section 2(c),
supra note 15.
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4. Use judicial double talk. 26
5. Take seriously the references to competition and the provisions for defenses, and, in reliance upon the fact that RobinsonPatman is formally incorporated in the general body of American
27
anti-trust laws, attempt to preserve the spirit of those laws.
X\VHAT THE SUPREME COURT THINKS

Now

The decision in Standard Oil Co. v. FederalTrade Commission2
indicates that the Court may be coming around to the last mentioned
method of handling the Act.
Standard Oil was charged, under section 2(a), with unfairly
competing with independent retailers and its own retail stations
by selling at a discount to wholesalers who resold at cut prices.
Standard refined gasoline in Indiana, shipped it to Michigan
and distributed from storage tanks there. Sale to retailers was
made at a "posted tank wagon price." Standard also supplied four
"wholesale customers" in the Detroit area. They had their own
storage tanks and delivery trucks. One engaged entirely in the
direct sale of gas to the public at cut rates. The others re-sold to
cut-rate retailers, who retailed at prices less than the "posted tank
wagon price" at which their competitors purchased. The "wholesale
customers" paid 1%/ per gallon less than the "posted tank wagon
price."
Standard clearly made its low price in good faith to meet the
lower prices of other refineries. The charge of price discrimination
was based upon the theory that the sales to the favored customers
made it possible for them to re-sell at less than the prevailing retail
price, thus injuring "retailer-competitors," including Standard itself in its capacity as operator of 200 service stations.
Standard defended on the grounds that its sales were intra-state;
that lower costs justified the lower price; that the price was made
in good faith to meet a competitor's price; and that the order of
the Commission made Standard responsible for the price at which
its customers resold.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the cease and desist order with a
modification here immaterial. 2 The Court conceded that Standard's
26. The inconsistencies in Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F. 2d 210

(7th Cir. 1949) are pointed up in Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 27, 73, n. 142 (1949) by printing in italics the sentences which

give lip-service to a free enterprise economy.

27. McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-Patinan Act: Possibilities of Strict Construction, 4 Law & Contemp. Probs. 410 (1937).
28. 340 U. S. 231 (1951)..
29. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 172 F. 2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
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sales were within the "meeting competition" proviso of Section 2 (b)
but said this was merely a procedural rebuttal of the prima-facie
case--not a defense. Since the discount to the favored wholesalers
made continuous price cutting by them possible, it could be restrained as an injury to retailer's competition even though Standard
showed that it was merely meeting refiner's competition.
The decision brought joy to the service station operators. No
more gasoline price wars. Nobody asked what the Detroit motorists
thought!
In a five to three decision the Supreme Court refused to go
along. Two things are clear from the decision. First, sales of this
type are in interstate commerce-there will be no retreat from the
"stream of commerce" doctrine 0 to dodge the problems of Robinson-Patman. 31 Second, meeting a competitor's lower price is an
absolute defense. The court did not pass upon Standard's attempted
3 2

cost justification.

The decision represents a victory for the philosophy of the
Sherman Act over that of Robinson-Putman.3 3 Price wars can continue, subject to as yet undefined limitations. The difference in
point of view is all the clearer after reading the dissent. The
dissenters caught the spirit of the sponsors of the measure-to end
price wars. But perhaps the majority of the court is nearer to the
true intent of the Congressional majority that accepted the bill.
Under the court's opinion the businessman may only meet the
lawful lower price of a competitor. He cannot underbid him. Such
a view falls short of establishing a principle which can be regarded
as practical since it implies that a businessman cannot independently
30. Stafford v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 495 (1922).

31. 340 U. S. 231, 238 (1951).
32. The difficulty with the cost proviso is that it finally comes down to
how to distribute overhead costs. Hamilton, Cost as a Standardfor Price, 4
Law & Contemp. Probs. 321 (1937) ; Austin, Price Discrimination, Chapter
3, American Law Institute (1950), Fuchs, The Requirement of Exachiess in
the Justification of Price and Service Differentials under the RobinsonPatman Act, 30 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1951) ; Sawyer, Accounting and Statistical
Proof in Price Discrimination Cases, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 244 (1951); Note,
Proof of Cost Differentials under Robinson-Patmnan Act, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
1011 (1952).
33. Commissioner Mason, who dissented when the case was before
the Federal Trade Commission, hailed the decision as "a reversal of the 'cry
baby' philosophy on meeting competitors' prices." Mason, Progress of the
Federal Trade Commission, CCH Business Practices, 1951 Symposium, 50.
The Court said, at 340 U. S. 248-249: "The heart of our national economic
policy has long been faith in the value of competition. In the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act, 'Congress was dealing
with competition, which it sought to protect.'. . . We need not now reconcile,
in its entirety, the economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Patman
'Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts."
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bid low for business without accurate knowledge of what his competitor may be bidding? 4 Such a concept represents a departure
from the statutory concept of "an equally low price of a competitor." The lawful notion comes from the Stalcy case 35 where
the Staley Company was not permitted to imitate an illegal basing
6
point system instituted by its principal competitor. A similar
burden on knowing all prices and costs is thrown upon buyers
by the Commission under Section 2(f) .7 However, under the
Sherman Act, as applied in the Sugar Institute case3s businessmen
were enjoined from giving such price information to competitors.
Since the Standard Oil decision there has been one limitation
and one extension in the lower courts. The Second circuit upheld
a cease and desist order where the respondent met a competitor's
price for a large quantity by offering the same price for a smaller
quantity, under a discount schedule based on the total amount purchased from all suppliers."9 The Southern California District Court,
in triple damage actions brought by competitors of Arden Farms,
a large ice cream manufacturer, has extended the scope of the
Standard Oil decision. 40 In the Los Angeles area, Arden was losing
customers to competitors who made sporadic price concessions to
individual customers. It struck back with an area-wide price reduction, available to all customers in Los Angeles, but maintained its
prices in other areas. (Arden itself might have invoked RobinsonPatman rather than responding to its competitor's price cut.) In dismissing the action, Judge Yankwich took the view that such price
cutting was authorized by Section 2(b) as interpreted in the
Standard Oil case.
At the 1951 Term the Ruberoid case 4 furnished an opportunity
to clarify the problem of functional discounts, but the Court merely
affirmed a Commission order against price discrimination couched
in a partial paraphrase of the statutory language. The dissent
34. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F. 2d 378, 155 F. 2d 1016 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 734 (1946).
35. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945).
36. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726 (1945).
37. Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 194 F. 2d 433 (7th
Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 344 U. S. 809 (1952).
38. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 533 (1936). The
Code of Ethics of the Institute, condemned by the Court, provided: "All discriminations between customers should be abolished. To that end sugar should
be sold only upon open prices and terms publicly announced."
39. FTC v. Standard Brands, 189 F. 2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951).
40. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms, CCH Trade Reg. Rep.,
ff 67,266 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
41. FTC v. Ruberoid Co.. 343 U. S. 470 (1952), arflirning 189 F. 2d
893, 191 F. 2d 294 (2d Cir. 1951).
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criticized the Court and the Commission for not facing up to the
4

problem".
In Moore v. Mead Service Co.43 the court denied certiorari after

the Tenth Circuit had held an illegal boycott to which the plaintiff
was a party did not provide a defense under the last proviso of section 2(b). 4 Here the merchants of a town, in order to keep a local
baker from shutting down, agreed not to patronize his out-of-town
competitor. The out-of-towner later cut prices and the merchants
broke their agreement and bought from him. The local baker then
brought his successful triple-damage suit.
The Minneapolis-Honeywell45 case was disposed of at the present term by dismissal because the petition for certiorari was not
timely filed. The Seventh Circuit reversed a Commission order
against a quantity discount schedule by finding that there was no
injury either to competitor competition or to customer competition. 4 1'
Justice Black, in dissent, thought the result below in square conflict with the Morton Salt case, 47 a question the rest of the court
did not discuss.
Some clue as to what the Court may ultimately do may be found
in the Schwegmann case. 48 Although the Miller-Tydings" issue
42. Justice Jackson, dissenting, at 343 U. S. 481: "Admitting that the
statute is 'vague and general in its wording,' it does not follow that a cease
and desist order should be. I think such an outcome of administrative proceedings is unacceptable.... The courts have derived no more detailed 'guiding
yardsticks' from the Commission than from Congress. On the contrary, the

ultimate enforcement is further confused by the administrative proceeding,
because it winds up with an order which literally forbids what the Act ex-

pressly allows and thus adds to the difficulty of eventual sanctions should they
become necessary."
43. 190 F. 2d 540 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 902 (1952).
44.

Section 2(b) provides in part: ".

.

. nothing herein contained shall

prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned. . .
45. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 21 U. S. L. Week
4084 (1952).
46. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F. 2d 786
(7th Cir. 1951). In this case before the Commission, Commissioner Mason
had dissented, saying: "The Commission majority contends that in some
cases Minneapolis-Honeywell did not lower its price to meet competitors but
lowered its price to get assemblers of heating units who used MinneapolisHoneywell controls to sell the finished product cheaper to the consumer.
What an unhappy bit of evidence to justify a cease and desist order against
any businessman! The respondent got caught trying to reduce prices to consumers ... ." F.T.C. Dkt. 4920 (1948).
47. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948).
48. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951).
49. 15 U. S. C. § 1 as amended, 50 Stat. 693 (1937). Miller-Tydings
was passed as a rider to the District of Columbia appropriation act to avoid
a veto, and was even less a part of the New Deal than Robinson-Patman. Its
repeal has been consistently advocated by both the Department of Justice and
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there raised is distinguishable from the problems raised under
Robinson-Patman, both acts present the question of what the
courts should do to protect consumers when Congress fails to
provide for their interests.
The majority of the Court cut the heart out of Miller-Tydings.
It looked to the statute itself, rather than to legislative history.
It found no mention of non-signer provisions and freed non-signers
from "fair trade" restraints. The minority, looking at legislative
history, found a clear intent by the sponsors to validate non-signer
provisions sub silentio. It is perhaps important that Justices Jackson
and Minton based their concurrence squarely upon a repudiation
of the technique of statutory construction that looks for hidden intentions in legislative history."° The decision, destined to be overruled by Congress, set off metropolitan price wars which possibly
asserted more downward leverage on the prices of formerly "fair
traded" articles than all the efforts of the Office of Price Stabilization."1
EARLY CoMMIssIoN VICTORIEs
Prior to the StandardOil case, the Court had followed the Commission's lead in economic matters with respect to basing points,
quantity discounts and brokerage.
The impact of the basing point decisions, 52 however, is on industrial location rather than on the cost of living. The Corn Prodthe Federal Trade Commission. No department has publicly opposed Robinson-Patman, although the Department of Justice refused to participate in the
presentation of the Trade Commission's argument in the Standard Oil case.
18 U. S. L. Week 3210 (1950).
50. 341 U. S. 395-397 (1951).
51. See Rahl, Resale Price Maintenance,State Action and the Antitrust
Laws: Effect of Schwegnann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 46 Ill.
L. Rev. 349 (1951); Comment, 61 Yale L. J., 381 (1952). Congress undid
the effect of the decision by specifically validating the non-signer provisions
of the state acts in the McGuire bill. 66 Stat. 632, 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp.
1952). In reluctantly signing the bill President Truman suggested that the
whole subject both of Miller-Tydings and Robinson-Patman should be reexamined.
52. The cases provoked a flood of comment including: Symposium,
37 Geo. L. J. 135 (1949) ; Edwards, Delivered Prices: Doing Business under
the Present Law, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 743 (1949) ; Smithies, Economic Consequcnces of the Basing Point Decisions, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 308 (1949) ; Dubose,
The Delivered Price Controversy and the O'M[ahonev Bill, 38 Geo. L. J. 200
(1950); Symposium on Delivered Pricing, 15 Law & Contemp. Probs. 123
(1950) ; Edwards, Doing Business under the Present Law About Delivered
Prices, 11 La. L. Rev. 347 (1951) ; Comment, Price Systems and Competilo: The Basbig Point Issues, 58 Yale L. J. 426 (1949) ; Fetter, Exit Basing
Point Pricing,38 Am. Econ. Rev. 815 (1948) ; Edwards, Basing Point Decisions and Business Practices, 38 Am. Econ. Rev. 828 (1948). Congress
passed legislation to overrule the decisions, but the President vetoed the bill
CCH Trade Reg. Rep., f 61,274.
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icts Refining case53 presented a single basing point system. Sales
were at delivered prices computed by adding to the base price at
Chicago the published freight tariff from Chicago to the point of
delivery. Shipments were made from either Chicago or Kansas City.
The delivered price on shipments from Kansas City included an
amount of "freight" that did not correspond to the freight actually
paid.
In upholding the Commission's charge of price discrimination
under Section 2(a), the Supreme Court said in part:
".. . Since the cost of glucose, a principal ingredient of low
priced candy, is less at Chicago, candy manufacturers there are
in a better position to compete for business, and manufacturers
... distant
from the basing point .
5.4

.

. are in a less favorable

position."
The Staley case 55 involved a competitor of Corn Products located
at Decatur, Ill., who also used Chicago as the basing point. Staley
sought to defend proceedings under Section 2(a) on the ground
that it was meeting Corn Products' lower price. Rejecting this
contention, the Court employed the "lawful price" interpretation
with respect to Section 2(b). Robinson-Patman objections, in these
cases, were based on the low prices to the Chicago purchasers.
Sounder objections could be made to the high prices charged purchasers where "phantom freight" was included-indeed basing
points might have been outlawed without reference to RobinsonPatman at all. 56
The "new" Cement Institute case 57 involved an industry-wide
multiple basing point system. In addition to violations of Section
2(a) the Commission spelled out numerous unfair trade practices
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act58 which
could have been treated as specific acts in restraint of trade under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court pointed out this obvious
overlap and ruled that Section 2(a) was violated. The identical
prices charged by the members of the Cement Institute, whether
justified or not under Section 2(b), would still be sufficient to
53. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726 (1945).
54. 324 U. S. 726, 738. The court also said: "The statute is designed
to reach such discriminations 'in their incipiency' before the harm to competition is effected. It is enough that they 'may' have the prescribed effect." Ibid.
55. FTC v. A. E Staley lfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945).
56. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F. 2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948),
aff'd, sub norn Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U. S. 956 (1949) was brought under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act alone.
57. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
58. 15 U. S. C. § 41 et seq. (1946).
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warrant the necessary inference of concerted agreement to establish a conspiracy under the Sherman Act.59
Although Robinson-Patman did not here prove controlling, it
is in cases such as this that it most resembles an anti-trust device.
In almost every other price discrimination situation the Act is
violated by lowering prices or granting unduly large discounts
which produce a downward pressure on the market. RobinsonPatman discourages price cutting and competition by restraining,
if not prohibiting, such practices. The basic effect of the Act is at
war with the anti-trust concept proper of breaking up monopoly
and promoting the opportunity for freedom of competition. 0
It remains to be seen how effective the Act has been with respect to the price policies at which it was aimed. The Morton Salt
Company sold its table salt to wholesalers, jobbers, and retailers,
including the five largest retail chains, on a quantity discount basis
available to all customers. The prices ranged from an L.C.L.
quotation of $1.60 down to a low of $1.35 for purchasers of 50,000
cases per year.
Only the five largest chains were in a position to purchase at the
$1.35 price. As a result they could retail at a price lower than
wholesalers could offer independents. Upholding the Commission's
cease and desist order, Justice Black said:
"Theoretically these discounts are equally available to all,
but functionally they are not ... no single independent retail
grocery store, and probably no single wholesaler, bought as
many as 50,000 cases or as much as $50,000 worth of table salt
in one year.... The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman
Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be
an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage
over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity
purchasing ability....
The court further held it was sufficient for the Commission to
show a "reasonable possibility" of injury to competition; also that
59. Comment, 58 Yale L. J. 426, 453 (1949) : "As the statute now stands
it threatens sporadic semi-concealed price cutting. This activity is price discrimination, for some buyers benefit from the secret price and others do not.
But it is such a powerful competitive force that industries adopt rigid de-

livered price systems to stop it.... Use of Robinson-Patman against sporadic

hidden price cutting would tend to calcify the prices that the anti-trust laws

in general are supposed to make flexible."

60. See Rostow, Monopoly under the Sherman Act: Power or Picrpose. 43 Ill.
L. Rev. 745, 749 (1949) : ". . . Conditions of business depression
make anti-trust enforcement psychologically difficult for judges to accept. The

Congresq passed the Mfiller-Tydings Act and the Robinson-Patman Act,
both of which operate fundamentally to restrict rather then to encourage
competition. .. "
61. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S.37, 42-43 (1948).
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detailed proof of cost savings must be introduced to justify carload
discounts.
Significant here is the majority's lumping all of respondent's
quantity discounts for similar treatment. To be underscored also, is
the Court's use of the word "functionally" in its non-technical sense.
Such context, albeit innocent of implied meaning, serves to drive
home the fact that the Court was dealing with quantity discounts as
"quantity discounts," regardless of the fact that respondent sold
under this system to all comers-jobbers, wholesalers and retail
chains. One of the most important Robinson-Patman issues left
2
open is the status of economically justified functional discounts.
Yet it is in the telescoping of market functions that savings which
can be passed on to consumers are frequently made possible.
By lumping all of the respondent's discounts together, absent
cost justification for quantity differentials, the majority focuses
attention on the deficiencies in economic reality of an act which
applies alike to functional and arbitrary practices in marketing.
Under the cost proviso of section 2(a) and the burden of proof
established in section 2(b) there is no reason why the court should
not put the respondent to its proof with regard to all its discounts.
Yet, as a matter of trade practice, there is no question but that the
carload discount, where reasonable in amount, is as established in
the business world as the charging of interest on a promissory note.
The Champion Spark Plug case,53 has not yet reached the courts.
Champion is charged with an illegal price discrimination because it
sells spark plugs to Ford at a considerably lower price than the
price charged dealers who sell replacements to car owners. Ford's
price is calculated on the basis of what it would probably cost Ford
to make its own plugs, as General Motors does. This is regarded
by the Commission as bribing Ford not to compete.
The discount situation today is this: (1) Under Allorton Salt,"
quantity discounts cannot be given without a detailed cost justification-the generality that it is usually cheaper to sell in large
62. "If we are to believe some of our staff ... we have authority to wipe

out wholesalers, jobbers and brokers by declaring that the functional discounts they collect are unlawful." Commissioner Mason in CCH Business
Practices: 1951 Symposium 51. See generally, Schniderman, Tie Tyranny

of Labels-A Study of Functional Discounts under the Robinron-Patman
Act, 60 -arv. L. Rev. 571 (1947).
63. Matter of Champion Spark Plug Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 3977 (pending);
Hansen, The Champion Case: What Is Competition? 29 Harv. Bus. Rev. 89
(May 1951).
64. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948).
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68
quantities no longer suffices ;6 (2) under Ruberoid, if customers
sometimes compete for retail sales they must be charged the same
price, even though they generally operate on different echelons in
6
7
the scheme of distribution; (3) under Minneapolis-Honeywell,
comon
there is no legislative inhibition if competitors keep right
peting, since the act requires an "injury to competition"; (4) under
6
the circuit court decision in Automatic Canteen," buyers accept
discounts and price cuts at their peril, since they must prove that
the seller acted legally in granting them; and (5) under the theory
69
of the complaint in Champion Spark Phg, the use of the product
by the buyer is immaterial-thus carrying the disregard of the
functions of the retailer, wholesaler and integrated chain to its
harsh conclusion.
Legally, the safe thing to do appears to be to have one high
r
price for everybody. Even after Standard Oil7 the competitive
practice of going below a rival's price to get the order (or even
meeting an unlawful price, under Staley"') is a violation of Robin-3
son-Patman. The Moss" case is still good law. Arden Farms,7
upholding an area-wide price cut to meet competitive conditions
does not touch the discount problem, and represents the limit to
which any court has gone in upholding traditional competitive
methods since Robinson-Patman.

THE TRIPLE DAMAGE THREAT

In addition to fearing action by the Federal Trade Commission,
the businessman considering a price cut must allow for possible
legal action by his competitors. Since Robinson-Patman is technically a part of the Sherman Act, anyone who is injured by a viola74
tion may bring an action for triple damages. The possibilities for
a plaintiff's bonanza were largely overlooked for ten years after
•65. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F. 2d 620 (6th Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 557 (1939).
66. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470 (1952).
67. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 21 U. S. L. Week
4084 (1952).
68. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 194 F. 2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952), cert.
graited,344 U. S. 809 (1952).
69. Matter of Champion Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 3977 (pending).
70. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231 (1951).
71. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. 324 U. S. 746 (1945).
72. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F 2d 378, 155 F. 2d 1016 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 734 (1946).
73. Balian Ice Co. v. Arden Farms, CCH Trade Reg. Rep., II 67,266
(S.D. Cal. 1952).
74. 15 U. S. C. § 7 (1946).
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to
the passage of the Act. The Supreme Court called attention
75
them in a dictum in Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co.
Counsel for Bruce's Juices took the hint and recovered a verdict
which was modified and upheld in the Fifth Circuit.y8 A similar
case was remanded for a new trial in the Eighth Circuit.y7 The
actual damages in the two cases were fixed at $185,000, which
tripled to over $500,000-and there are 2,938 customers who
suffered from the same "discriminations."78 American Can's quantity discount system was found discriminatory in that at least
$500,000 worth of cans had to be purchased to get any discount
at all. Two customers received the maximum discount of 5% for
purchases of over $7,000,000. From 19 to 36 customers received
smaller discounts. Service discrimination was also charged because
a customer who had his packing plant next to American Can's
Austin, Ind., plant was served by a conveyor belt. Of this, the
District court said:
". .. the fact that it is impractical, or even impossible, to
furnish proportionally equal facilities to all customers cannot
serve as a justification for furnishing the facilities to those
where it is practical, if the furnishing of79 such facilities discriminates in favor of those receiving them."
The number of such suits is increasing. 0 Reported cases cannot
give the complete picture. How many suits have been compromised?
How many price cuts have been considered but never made? In
business language freedom to make a price cut is a synonym for
freedom of competition. Price policy used to be decided by the
executive in conference with his sales manager. Under RobinsonPatman it must be decided on advice of counsel.
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE CHAINS?

The principal giant that Robinson-Patman was supposed to
slay was A & P.8 , It was imperative for the Commission to try to do
something about this leading chain.
75. 330 U. S. 743 (1947). In that case the court held that promissory
notes representing the purchase price of goods were collectible even though
the vendor had violated Robinson-Patman.
76. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (D.C. Fla.
1949), aff'd, 187 F. 2d 919, modified, 190 F. 2d 73 (5th Cir. 1951).
77. Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484
(D.C. Ark. 1949), reversed, 191 F. 2d 28 (8th Cir. 1951).
78. Rose, Your Right to Lower Your Prices,29 Harv. Bus. Rev. 90, 93
(Sept. 1951).
79. Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., supra note 77 at 498.
80. CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 1948-1951 reports 18 such cases. It has
recently been held that they may be also maintained as class actions. Kainz v.
Anheuser-Busch Inc., 194 F. 2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952).
81. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United
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The first attack was pitched on the brokerage clause.82 Prior to
1936 A & P maintained a number of central buying offices. Salaried
employees of A & P performed various services for manufacturers
and sellers, identical with those performed by indepedent brokers,
who were not employed in purchases by A & P. These sellers paid
brokerage to the chain.
After the passage of Robinson-Patman, A & P instructed its field
men to accept no further brokerage, but to buy on one of these
bases: (1) to purchase at a net price which would reflect a reduction in an amount equal to the brokerage previously paid; (2) to
execute "quantity discount agreements" providing for payment to
A & P of an amount equal to the brokerage formerly paid, or (3)
to have the seller pay brokerage into escrow until the legality of
the payments could be determined.
A & P contended: (1) that the net prices, allowances and discounts were received for services rendered to sellers, and (2) that
such net prices were possible because of savings in brokerage,
travel expenses, etc., which justified the price differentials.
The Third Circuit s3 ruled against A & P and sustained the
Commission's contention that the "services" of the field buying
agents were "rendered" to A & P and not to the sellers. A & P's
second contention that savings justified the net prices was an
attempt to apply the cost proviso of section 2(a) to a case brought
under section 2(c). The court held, however, that the two clauses
were separate, and the cost defense does not apply in an action
brought under the brokerage clause. On this theory cost savings,
no matter how clearly shown, are not a justification for paying
brokerage to anyone who is the buyer's agent. A & P's supplier,
who receives free brokerage service, gets a windfall-A & P incurs
the expense of performing the brokerage function and ends up
with a higher cost instead of a saving to pass on to the consumer.
Significantly, other victims of the brokerage clause have been
States, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1265 (1949) contrasts the views of what constitutes

competition in terms of "market condition" versus "acceptable business practice." Before the advent of the chains, there existed a competitive market condition-an unlimited number of concerns in the field-but little realistic competi-

tive action. "Acceptable business performance" arrived only when the chains

started after business, but their activity produced a reduction in the number of
competitors in the market. With regard to Robinson-Patman, Dean Mason
concluded: "We don't want much disturbance of the channels of distribution
from competitive sources and are apparently acquiescing in a re-interpretation
of the Robinson-Patman Act 'injury to competition' as 'injury to a competitor.'
82. 15 U. S. C. § 13(c) (1946).

83. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F. 2d 667 (3rd Cir.

1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (1940).
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small businessmen. In the Oliver8 4 and Biddle8" cases it was invoked
to strike down collective purchasing agencies operated for local
wholesalers. The Quality Bakers 6 case applied Section 2(c) to a
co-operative association of small bakers, despite the presence in the
act of a section designed to protect co-ops. 87 The Modern Marketing
case8 s applied the section to strike down a central purchasing agency
operated for wholesale grocers. Here the manufacturers paying
brokerage were Diamond Match, Morton Salt, Quaker Oats, Ralston Purina, \Vesson Oil and Proctor and Gamble. Enough said!
A & P survived the difficulities of doing business under Robinson-Patman by going into super markets.89 In 1946 it was indicted
on the charge that its buying practices violated Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. A conviction was secured99 and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. 91 The court said in part:
"....

While A & P tried to rig up various contracts with its

suppliers that would give the suppliers a semblance of compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, by colorably relating
the discriminatory preferences allowed to cost savings, the
primary consideration with A & P seemed to be to get the discounts, lawfully if possible, but to get them at all events. . .. """
A & P did not appeal and paid a $175,000 fine. The Government then filed its current civil suit for dissolution.92 A & P's telling defense was not filed in court but addressed to America's housewives in its grocery ads.
84. Oliver Bros.; Inc. v. FTC, 102 F. 2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).

85. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F. 2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 305 U. S. 634 (1938).
86. Quality Bakers v. FTC, 114 F. 2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940).
87. Robinson-Patman, § 4, 15 U. S. C. § 13(b) (1946). It could be
argued Congress intended the section to apply only to farmers' co-ops.
88. Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v. FTC, 149 F. 2d 970 (7th Cir.
1945).
89. Adelman Effective Competition and the Anti-Trust Laws, 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 1289, 1337 (1948).
90. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(D.C. Ill. 1946). Judge Lindley said, at page 676: "Sometimes I doubt
whether we ever needed the Robinson-Patman Law, with all its elusive
uncertainty. I have thought that the Sherman Act, properly interpretated and
administered, would have remedied all the ills meant to be cured."
91. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 173 F. 2d 79
(7th Cir. 1949) ; Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic
Theory, 63 Q. J. Econ. 238 (1949) ; Note, Trouble Begins in the "New"
Sherman Act: The Perplexing Story of the A & P Case, 58 Yale L. J. 969
(1949); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 Ill. L. Rev. 743
(1950) ; Stanford, An Old Problem in a Modern Guise; Chain Stores and
Efficient Integration under the Sherman Act, 1 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1950) ;
Fleming, Butsiness and the Antitrust Laws, 28 Harv. Bus. Rev. (May 1950).
91a. United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 173 F. 2d 79,
88 (7th Cir. 1949).
92. CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 1 61,226.
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In condemning A & P for battling its supliers for low prices,
the courts, under the compulsion of the Robinson-Patman Act, have
neglected the fact that A & P is not exclusively fighting for its own
profits-a large portion of these savings have always been passed
on to consumers.
Housewives alone cannot control the price of groceries. Theoretically, consumer co-ops could supply the needed protection. The
ingenuity of American business, however, provides a unique institution-the integrated chain store, buying at the lowest possible
price, eliminating middlemen, operating efficiency, passing on substantial savings to the consumer and relying on volume for profits.
Regardless of whether the marginal retailer competitor's need for
legislative support ever served as valid justification for the passage
of such an act, Robinson-Patman has proved to be clearly against
the interest of consumers. Any sustained price reduction based on
legitimately achieved lower costs is of benefit to consumers. This is
a basic principle that every housewife knows.
THE OPEN MARKET

The American capitalistic enterprise system has emerged from
an economic background characterized by freedom of competition.
Essential to this development has been the open market which has
produced the greatest flow of economic benefits to a single nation
over a longer period that has occurred elsewhere in history.
On occasion monopolies have developed in certain areas of our
economy which have threatened the maintenance of the open market. For such situations, the anti-trust laws were enacted.
The open market is all that the words imply. It is the flexible
and fluid channel of distribution through which commodities and
manufactured goods must flow from raw material to consumer.
It is coordinated manufacturing, wholesaling, jobbing, commission
selling, brokerage and retailing. On the selling side it demands
efficiency. On the buying side this efficiency is tested by price. A law
looking only to the selling side and not geared to cyclical fluctuations, and which penalizes efficiency, does not deserve any place on
the statute books.

